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20130126
20130203
Search Results 0 to 16 of about 17 (some duplicates have been removed)
military action is not a viable, feasible, responsible option. >> chris lawrence is at the pentagon and chris hagel was also accused of wanting to gut the defense department so what kind of day do you think is on tap for him? >> carol, it's likely to be a pretty rough one. with avenue got word from insiders haguele is going to testify that the militant group hezbollah is a terrorist organization and that military options are on the table for iran. it's not earth-shattering, except when you compare it to what he's already said. chuck hagel's past is about to come roaring back at him. >> good morning, guys, how are you. >> reporter: how he's voted, what he said. >> he has insisted that the israelis negotiate with hamas, a terrorist organization. >> reporter: so one of the first questions could be, will you support israel? recently hagel promised he would, unequivocably saying his record's been distorted but he'll have to explain what he said before his nomination. >> mike referenced to a quote "jewish lobby" which i don't believe exists. >> reporter: senator also demand to know what h
. it is for these reasons that i believe he is the wrong person to lead the pentagon at this perilous and consequential time. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you very much, senator inhofe. we have two former chairmen of this committee with us to introduce senator hagel. no senator has had two dearer friends or better mentor is i have hadtors than with senators nunn and warner. i want to welcome them back to this committee. i don't have to tell them that they are among dear, dear friends. it is a real treat to welcome you back to the committee. i will call on you, senator nunn, first. i will call you alphabetically. i have no better way to do it. sam? [laughter] sam, welcome back. >> first, for the record, seniority and age are two different things. senator levin, ranking member inhofe, i am honored to join my friend john warner in presenting chuck hagel to the committee and recommending that chuck be confirmed as our secretary of defense. i think it is worth noting that 68 years ago this month, john warner and listed in the u.s. -- enlisted in the u.s. navy to fight in world war ii. that was the start of
there was no distinct central africa command in terms of the way the pentagon cleaved the world. in 2007 there was africa command and it currently is stationed in europe, not actually in africa. there have been a variety of initiatives to train the soldiers of different african regimes, counterterrorism training, other kinds of training and in fact the soldiers of mali. mali was one of the star pupils in the -- >> and they're the same people now we're fighting. >> right. so i want to turn to mali in a second but first i want to push back -- not push back but to play devil's advocate about this intervention question on libya. when you look at all the negative consequences of libya, what do you say to the point about syria? everything that you could say about libya, weapons, destabilization, refugees, everything that's terrible about what has been the fallout of libya seems to me happening in syria as well where there hasn't been the same intervention and so maybe it's just the nature of the conflict as opposed to what the u.s. or the west does. >> no, that's a copout. it's not the nature
working at the nsc on detail and nato headquarters, the middle east and the pentagon. pentagon. he was adviser to four presidents, president obama asked them to lead his afghanistan-pakistan paula's review in early 2009, and do that for a couple of months before apple first returning to brookings. bruce has written two books in the time has been a, a third is about to come out and i will mention that in the second of the first two were about al qaeda and then about the is pakistan relationship. so the search for al qaeda, the deadly embrace, his new book coming out next month is avoiding armageddon. it's a story by the u.s.-india pakistan relationship and crisis management over the last half-century or so. general stan mcchrystal is a 1976 graduate of west point, spent 34 years in u.s. army, retiring as a four-star general the summer 2010. he has been command in afghanistan. use the correct of the joint staff but perhaps the military circles most of all as i mentioned this five year period at joint special operations command makes a memorable and historic. general casey at his reti
-- from hospital employees not from patients. >>> the pentagon wants to hire computer experts and cyber experts. washington has been warning about a spike in cyber attacks. they are encouraging college students to pursue careers in cyber security. the cyber command's level is about 900. that number is expected to reach about 5,000 over the next several years. >>> 7:10. and an attempt to stop your pg&e rates from going up. we'll tell you who is stepping in to protect your money and why they say the increase is not needed. >> i've been here for a long time. i just want to see my family. >> local immigrants reacting to news that true immigration reform may come soon and what the president will be announcing today. you know, in my day you couldn't just start streaming six ways to sunday. you'd get knocked off. and sometimes, it took a minute to download a song. that's sixty seconds, for crying out loud. we know how long a minute is! sitting, waiting for an album to download. i still have back problems. you're only 14 and a half. he doesn't have back problems. you kids have got it too good i
coming out of the pentagon. one i was looking up now because i wanted to remember the numbers, and that was that the pentagon is beefing up cybersecurity forces, taking it from 900 to 4000 and putting a few billion dollars into it. the other one that is being beefed up in these times of budgetary constraints are the special forces. tom, would you talk about that generally? if you would talk about that in a broad nature and then we will come over to the nonexistent challenge that faces in asia. >> i will try to be brief. these are certainly needed and are believed to exploit, you know, this is pretty critical. but it is not qualitatively different from other forms of intelligence gathering or attempts by propaganda or by the military were a strategic situation. the special operations forces, to some degree in, is understandable. but as fred alluded to, we must direct action to magically appear and sustain themselves. if you have seen "zero dark thirty", it's a great picture of how the intelligence went and then the heroine appears at this brown looking base in afghanistan and a
including working at the n.s.c. on detail, at nato headquarters, brought at the middle east and the pentagon. he was advisor to four presidents, president obama asked him to lead his afghanistan-pakistan policy review in early 2009 and he did that for a couple of months before happily, for us, returning to brookings. bruce has written already two books in the time he's been here, actually a third is about to come out, i'll mention that in just a second, but the first two were about al qaeda and then about the u.s.-pakistan relationship "the deadly embrace." . his new book, coming out next month is "avoiding armageddon" and it's the story about the u.s.-india-pakistan relationship and crisis management over the last half century or so. general stan mcchrystal is a 1976 graduate of west point. spent 34 years in the u.s. army. retiring as a four-star general in the summer of 2010. he has been commander in afghanistan. he was the director of the joint staff. but perhaps in military circles, most of all, as i mentioned, this five-year period at joint special operations command makes him memorable
announcements coming out of the pentagon. i was looking at one just now because i was trying to remember the numbers. the pentagon is beefing up its cyber security force. the other one that is apparently being beefed up in these times of budgetary constraints or the special forces. tom, would you talk about that generally, and fred, if you talk about that in the broader nature of it. then we will get to the nonexistent challenge that faces us in asia. >> these new capabilities, cyber operations or whatever you want to call them, are certainly necessary and needed, and our ability to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum configured as the internet is pretty critical. it is not qualitatively different from other forms of intelligence gathering or attempts either by propaganda means or by direct attack took back the military or strategic situations. to some degree it is understandable, but as fred alluded, particularly direct action special operations unit don't just magically appear and sustain themselves. if you have seen "zero dark thirty, is a great picture of how the intelligence manhun
've seen two budget-related announcements coming out of the pentagon. one, i was looking up just now because i was trying to remember the numbers, and that is that the pentagon is beefing up its cybersecurity force, taking it from 900 to 4,000 and putting a few billion dollars into it. the other one that is apparently being beefed up in these times of budgetary constraints are the special forces. tom, would you just talk about that generally and then, fred, if you would talk about that not just in afghanistan, but in the broader battle and the nature of it, and then we'll come over to publish shah and the non-- membership shah and the nonexistent challenge that faces us in asia. [laughter] >> i'll try to be brief, dani. look, these new capabilities, you know, cyber operations or whatever you want to call them are certainly necessary and needed, and our ability to exploit, you know, the electromagnetic spectrum configured as the internet is, you know, pretty critical. but it's not qualitatively different from other forms of intelligence gathering or, you know, attempts to either by pr
week we've seen to budgets slated announcement coming out of the pentagon. one i was looking up just now because i was going to remember the numbers, and that is that the pentagon is beefing up its private security force, taking it from 900, to 4000, and putting a few billion dollars into it. the other one that is apparently being beefed up in these times of budgetary constraints are the special forces. tom, would you just talk about a generally? fred, if you talk about that not just in afghanistan but the broader battle at the nature of it and then we'll come over to transit and the nonexistent challenge that faces us in asia. >> i will try to be brief, danny. look, these new capabilities, cyber operations or whatever you want to call them, are certainly necessary, needed, and our abilities to exploit, you know, the electromagnetic spectrum continued as the internet is pretty critical. but it's not qualitatively different from other forms of intelligence gathering or, you know, attempts to, either by prop 10, or by direct attack, affect the military or strategic situation. the fondn
reasons, the pentagon and the planners have made their own case to the president. and with the new resource problem we confronted in mali, look what it took to support french against al qaeda sub contractors. if we can't do that when in fact americans are held hostage and killed, what kind of response do you really expect for . >> is that a consequence of the u.s. not getting involved in mali earlier? >> what is the implication from that we in effect need to be involved -- . >> the u.s. has been concerned about mali for at least eight nows. -- months only now there's a discussion about where we should do more. >> look, in the time of the great extra cater. we are -- that -- what is threaten, our foreign policy is not manic interventionism right now. that's not what we have to worry about here. >> let's move on. if you have a question, raise your hand. i'm going ask you to identify yourself. keep your question short. let's go to [inaudible] of radio-- and then go to the woman right here in the black and hand the microphone to her. >> hi, my name is -- [inaudible] that syria is part
in iraq was much worse than it appeared from from afar. i was coming out of the pentagon. it was clearly unsettled. it looked much worse than we had thought. the first hope was that if we got saddam hussein, that would solve the problem. we made an effort to do that. in december, we picked up saddam. it became obvious that, as one of my guys described, a bunch of former miss -- regime guys were not really running the beginning of the resistance, the beginning of the insurgency. zarqawi had started to build a network that took trained people, or iraqi sunnis -- trained people, iraqi sunnis, who had been dislocated from their position in society, sometimes government, sometimes military might and they were terrified of the shia, which was going to be dominant in the future. you had this combination of factors that was fear of the future, frustration against foreign invaders, and then -- not as much religious extremism as sometimes is perceived. it was not really an al qaeda religious movement. it was a political movement, but he got leveraged by some very clever work by people like abu mus
. it shall take a lot to pull this off. >> the pentagon has started to take steps to prepare itself for the sequestration and planning that has not taken place until now. >> they are laying off temporary employees. it is starting to happen. >> senator inhofe has been critical about not planning earlier. the >> there is a little brinkmanship going. i do believe there was a time and when each everybody said we are all against it so how can have them? there never was a path that the two sides could find that would lead them to averting it. >> the center was critical of the president in the stance of his overall military and mention three ways the president has worked for cuts, and delays, and additions to the military budget. when you talk to officers of line, and you find them as critical of the administration that what is: on average is very dramatic. this represents a huge threat to the united states. there are others that would argue it is more a regional. the ability to react is clearly limited. when you look at individual things, there are concernes. afghanistan is another issue.
was coming out of the pentagon. it was clearly unsettled. it looked much worse than we had thought. the first hope was that if we got saddam hussein, that would solve the problem. we made an effort to do that. appeared from from afar. in december, we picked up saddam. it became obvious that, as one of my guys described, a bunch of former miss -- regime guys were not really running the beginning of the resistance, the beginning of the insurgency. zarqawi had started to build a network that took trained people, or iraqi sunnis -- trained people, iraqi sunnis, who had been dislocated from their position in society, sometimes government, sometimes military might and they were terrified of the shia, which was going to be dominant in the future. you had this combination of factors that was fear of the future, frustration against foreign invaders, and then -- not as much religious extremism as sometimes is perceived. it was not really an al qaeda religious movement. it was a political movement, but he got leveraged by some very clever work by people like abu musab al-zarqawi. we were very sure he wa
Search Results 0 to 16 of about 17 (some duplicates have been removed)